The Scope of Evidentiary Review in
Constitutional Challenges to Agency Action
Conley K. Hurst†
When reviewing agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) instructs courts to “review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.” The
Supreme Court has interpreted this brief statement as a restriction on the evidentiary scope of judicial review under the APA. Courts may consider only the administrative record compiled by the agency, which includes all materials before the decisionmaker at the time he or she made the decision. The Supreme Court has
recognized one exception: plaintiffs may supplement the administrative record if
they make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior on the part of the
agency.
Courts consistently apply the record rule to arbitrary and capricious claims. It
is less clear whether the rule applies to constitutional claims. This issue crept into
two recent, high-profile Supreme Court cases—Department of Commerce v. New
York and Regents of the University of California v. Department of Homeland Security—but the Court has yet to definitively resolve the issue. In the meantime, lower
courts have developed three alternative approaches. This Comment argues that the
record rule, though one with a robust bad faith exception, should apply to all constitutional challenges to agency action. It analyzes the APA’s text, legislative history,
pre- and post-APA precedent, and policy considerations to argue for a record rule
approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Presidents have increasingly turned to the administrative
state to implement their political agendas.1 For example, one of
President Barack Obama’s signature accomplishments, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, was enacted not through legislation but through an agency policy statement.2 Likewise, President Donald Trump turned to the
administrative state to attempt to add a citizenship question to
the 2020 Census3 and to heighten the standards for immigrant
admissibility.4 When presidents enact controversial policies
through agency action, lawsuits inevitably follow.
Consider two recent Supreme Court cases. In Department of
Commerce v. New York,5 several states and localities challenged
the Trump administration’s decision to add a citizenship question
to the Census.6 The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to add the question violated the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act7 (APA) as well as the Enumeration Clause.8 The Court held, in a messy and divided opinion,
that the Enumeration Clause permitted the Secretary of
1
Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248
(2001) (“[T]he regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies [is] more and more an
extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda.”).
2
See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Alejandro Mayorkas, & John Morton, (June 15, 2012),
https://perma.cc/W432-E7LY (establishing DACA).
3
See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Commerce, to Karen Dunn Kelly,
Under Sec’y for Econ. Affairs, (Mar. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/PQU6-Q3G5.
4
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,294–95 (Aug.
14, 2019) (codified at various sections of 8 C.F.R.) (broadening the Immigration and Nationality Act’s “public charge” inadmissibility criteria, by which aliens are denied entry
because they are “likely at any time to become a public charge,” to include potential reliance
on an expanded number of government assistance programs).
5
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
6
See id. at 2561.
7
Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
8
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2563.
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Commerce to add the question but that the Secretary’s stated
reasons for doing so were pretextual.9 Thus, the Court remanded
to the agency to provide a better explanation for the decision.10
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California,11 several groups challenged the Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA.12 The plaintiffs argued
that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA
and a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. A divided Court struck down the Trump administration’s
decision as arbitrary and capricious, holding that the Secretary of
Homeland Security failed to consider important aspects of the issue,
including whether the rescission would jeopardize important reliance interests.13 But the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims (by way of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause) because the plaintiffs did not “raise a plausible inference”
that invidious discrimination was a motivating factor for the rescission.14 Lurking in both Department of Commerce and Regents
was a seemingly minor evidentiary issue as of yet unaddressed by
the Court.
When reviewing agency action, the APA instructs courts to
“review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.”15 In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,16 the Supreme
Court interpreted this brief statement as a restriction on the evidentiary scope of judicial review under the APA: review is limited
to the record compiled by the administrative agency, which
properly includes all materials that were before the decisionmaker at the time he or she made the decision.17 As a result,
APA plaintiffs typically cannot introduce evidence that was not
actually considered by the agency in the decision-making process.
This evidentiary limitation is known as the “record rule.”18 The
Supreme Court has recognized one exception: a plaintiff may introduce evidence that was not before the agency at the time of its

9

See id. at 2567, 2575.
Id. at 2576.
11 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
12 Id. at 1903.
13 Id. at 1913–15.
14 Id. at 1915–16 (plurality opinion).
15 5 U.S.C. § 706.
16 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
17 Id. at 420.
18 See Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2018).
10
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decision only if the plaintiff can make a “strong showing of bad
faith or improper behavior” on the part of the agency.19 The Court
has never addressed exactly what qualifies as a “strong showing
of bad faith or improper behavior,”20 but a strong showing that the
agency’s decision was motivated by factors not discussed in the
existing record would likely be enough.21
The record rule covers all lawsuits brought under the APA.22
Section 706 of the APA identifies the primary standards of judicial review for agency action.23 Formal agency action, including
rulemaking and adjudication under the APA’s formal procedures,
is subject to the “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard.24 Informal agency action, including rules enacted through the
APA’s notice and comment procedure, is frequently reviewed under the “arbitrary, capricious, [ ] abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law” standard.25 The arbitrary and capricious standard operates as a catchall standard of review when no
other standard is applicable.26
The APA also provides for judicial review of agency action
that is “contrary to constitutional right.”27 Though the record rule
applies to all APA lawsuits, some plaintiffs and courts have questioned whether it applies as strictly to agency action lawsuits
brought on constitutional grounds.28 Such constitutional

19

See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74.
See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2579 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“We have never before found Overton Park’s exception satisfied.”); Gavoor &
Platt, supra note 18, at 21–25.
21 See James D. Cromley & J. Michael Showalter, Going Beyond: When Can Courts
Look Past the Record in APA Review?, GEO. ENV’T L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8AYT-KUX3.
22 See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 9.
23 5 U.S.C. § 706.
24 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414.
25 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
26 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 745
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.). The other standards of review available under
APA § 706 are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right; without observance of procedure required by law; . . . [and] unwarranted
by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)–(D), (F).
27 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).
28 See, e.g., Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:19-CV-5210, 2020 WL
4667543, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2020) (“Caselaw is indeterminate concerning whether
extra-record discovery is appropriate for constitutional claims asserted in conjunction with
APA claims.”); Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 3d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2018)
(“The caselaw on a plaintiff’s ability to supplement an administrative record to support a
constitutional cause of action is sparse and in some tension.”).
20
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challenges are less common. But if Department of Commerce and
Regents—the equal protection challenges to controversial Trump
administration policies noted above—are any indication, they are
becoming more so. The Court’s guidance on the record rule has
been woefully limited,29 and it has never definitively answered the
question of whether the record rule applies to constitutional challenges.30 As constitutional challenges to agency action become
more common, this evidentiary question will continue to rear its
head.
This uncertainty requires resolution. The outcome of administrative law cases can hinge entirely on the admissibility of extrarecord evidence.31 Take Department of Commerce. Background
principles of administrative law require that agencies provide a
“reasoned explanation” of their actions.32 In considering whether
the Trump administration’s decision to include a citizenship question on the Census was a product of reasoned judgment, the
Court’s inquiry focused on the administrative record.33 The
Court’s decision to consider extra-record evidence—documents
undermining the Secretary’s stated motivation for adding the
question34—was critical. In remanding the decision for further
consideration, the Court stated that “the evidence tells a story
that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his
decision.”35 Just how reasonable an explanation seems can depend
on the scope of the administrative record.
These questions about the scope of evidence should not be left
to the unguided discretion of the trial judge. Rather, they should
be addressed through consistent, established means. Moreover,
resolution of this question must balance plaintiffs’ interest in receiving adequate judicial review and government agencies’ interest in avoiding burdensome litigation. Too much weight to government interests, and too little judicial review, could allow
agencies to get away with politically charged and constitutionally
29 See Peter Constable Alter, Note, A Record of What? The Proper Scope of an Administrative Record for Informal Agency Action, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1045, 1048, 1065 (2020).
30 Cf. Cook County v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Neither the
Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has articulated the rules governing discovery
where . . . a plaintiff brings a substantive constitutional challenge to agency action.”).
31 See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 3 (“The scope and domain of the administrative record is critical to APA review because the record can have dispositive effects on
litigation.”).
32 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
33 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573, 2575–76.
34 Id. at 2574–75.
35 Id. at 2575.
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suspect decision-making. Too much weight to private interests
could give activist interest groups a green light to thwart routine
regulation by pursuing wide-ranging discovery. A balanced resolution is badly needed.
This Comment explores whether constitutional challenges to
agency action should be subject to the same record rule that controls evidence in other APA lawsuits. It analyzes when courts
have allowed extra-record evidence in constitutional challenges to
agency action and what rules should govern this question. It argues that courts should approach constitutional challenges just
as they do other challenges brought under the APA: through the
existing record-rule framework. The APA does not distinguish between constitutional challenges and other challenges to agency
action, and neither should courts—at least from an evidentiary
perspective. While courts should not reflexively allow extra-record
evidence in these cases, this Comment argues that they should
embrace a broad reading of the Overton Park bad faith exception
to the record rule in constitutional challenges. The bad faith exception ensures that an insufficient administrative record does
not hinder plaintiffs trying to vindicate their constitutional
rights.
This Comment will proceed in four Parts. Part I explores the
record rule’s general legal background, including its practical application and exceptions. Part II discusses the record rule’s applicability to constitutional challenges to agency action, the Supreme Court’s inconclusive discussion of this area of the law, and
the divergent approaches of the lower courts. Part III explains
why a record rule approach is preferable for doctrinal reasons.
This discussion focuses on the text and legislative history of the
APA as well as the Supreme Court’s pre- and post-APA jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV explains why a record-rule approach is
also preferable for public policy reasons.
I. THE RECORD RULE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
This Part explores the legal background of the record rule.
Part I.A provides a brief overview of judicial review under the
APA. Part I.B then explains the Supreme Court’s textual and
theoretical justifications for the record rule. Finally, Part I.C discusses the recognized exceptions to the record rule and their practical application.
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A. The APA and Judicial Review of Agency Action
The APA has been called a “superstatute” and even a “subconstitution.”36 It acts as the “fundamental charter” for the administrative state,37 delineating basic default rules of agency procedure that are “not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.”38
The APA provides that any “person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof,”39 unless
review is precluded by statute or the questioned action is “committed to agency discretion by law.”40 The Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to enshrine a “basic presumption of judicial review” of agency action.41
The APA provides several specific causes of action against
agencies, including if agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction . . . ; [and] without observance of procedure required by law.”42 If an aggrieved party brings suit
against an administrative agency under the APA, the statute requires that the reviewing court “decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”43 Courts are required to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action” found to be in violation of any of the listed standards of
review.44
B. The Statutory and Theoretical Bases for the Record Rule
The APA is clear on the evidentiary scope of judicial review
of agency action: “[T]he court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party.”45 This simple sentence suggests
both a maximum (“the whole record”) and a minimum (“those
36 Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 363 (1978).
37 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90
IND. L.J. 1207, 1208 (2015) (quoting Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing
Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 874 (2007)).
38 Scalia, supra note 36, at 363.
39 5 U.S.C. § 702.
40 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
41 Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
42 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(D).
43 5 U.S.C. § 706.
44 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
45 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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parts of it cited by a party”) evidentiary standard for courts reviewing “agency action, findings, and conclusions.”46 This sentence is the basis for the record rule,47 first explicitly articulated
by the Supreme Court in Overton Park.48 There, the Supreme
Court considered a challenge, brought by Memphis residents,
against the Secretary of Transportation’s decision to build a highway through a popular park.49 The Court affirmed that judicial
review of this decision should generally be limited to the “full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he
made his decision.”50 Two years later, in Camp v. Pitts,51 the Court
reaffirmed the record rule, stating that “the focal point for judicial
review should be the administrative record already in existence,
not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”52
Courts generally agree that the administrative record includes
not just those materials considered directly by the agency decisionmaker but all materials considered by the agency as a whole
in its decision-making process.53
The theoretical basis for the record rule is the fundamental
notion that executive branch actions enjoy a “presumption of regularity” when reviewed by Article III courts.54 In other words,
courts presume—absent a showing to the contrary—that agency
officials have acted in good faith and have not misrepresented the

46 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 19. This phrase might also be
interpreted as simply giving courts permission to consider even those parts of the record
not cited by the parties. Even under this reading, the phrase suggests that courts should
not ordinarily look beyond the record.
47 See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 19 (“Section 10(e) of the APA, now codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 706, sets the textual lodestar for the record rule.”).
48 Alter, supra note 29, at 1060.
49 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 406.
50 Id. at 420. This statement was not without qualifiers, including the bad faith exception. See infra Part I.C. Some scholars have criticized the Overton Park opinion as confusing and inconsistent with the APA. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 22 n.38. And
though it was not exactly forceful in its articulation of the record rule, the opinion is
routinely cited for just that. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44
(1985); Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74. Perhaps Overton Park has been interpreted
to say something that it did not mean, but that is outside the scope of this Comment.
51 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
52 Id. at 142; see also Fla. Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 743–44 (“The task of the
reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review to the agency decision
based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.” (citation omitted)).
53 See Alter, supra note 29, at 1061.
54 See James N. Saul, Comment, Overly Restrictive Administrative Records and the
Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENV’T L. REV. 1301, 1311–13 (2008). For discussion of
the presumption of regularity, see generally Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2431 (2018).
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facts.55 The Supreme Court first explicitly articulated the presumption of regularity in 192656 and has reiterated it many times
since,57 though often without much explanation.58 The presumption of regularity reflects separation of powers concerns: courts
should not frustrate congressional directives or executive discretion by “prob[ing] the mental processes” of agency decisionmakers.59 The presumption also reflects institutional competence concerns: administrative agencies operate in highly specialized
spheres of expertise, and their decisions may rest on technical
reasoning or analysis.60 In the administrative-record context, we
may question the ability of a generalist judge to second-guess
whether a record submitted by an agency sufficiently explains a
specialized decision.
C. Exceptions to the Record Rule
The record rule is not without exceptions. After all, the presumption of regularity is a rebuttable presumption.61 In the
administrative-record context, APA plaintiffs can attempt to
rebut the presumption by bringing either a “motion to complete”
the record or a “motion to supplement” the record.62 This area of
law has been the subject of extraordinary confusion among lower
courts, primarily due to inconsistent terminology.63 Some judges

55

See Note, supra note 54, at 2433–34.
See United States v. Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“The presumption of
regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence
to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”).
57 See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415 (“Certainly, the Secretary’s decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity.”); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (affirming the “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as [agency] adjudicators”);
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001) (“[A] presumption of regularity attaches
to the actions of Government agencies.”).
58 Cf. Note, supra note 54, at 2432.
59 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938)).
60 Saul, supra note 54, at 1312; see also Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
61 See Chemical Found., 272 U.S. at 14–15 (“[I]n the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, courts presume that [public officials] have properly discharged their official duties.”).
62 Alter, supra note 29, 1057–58 (explaining the difference between record completion and record supplementation).
63 See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (conflating supplementation with completion); see also Alter, supra note 29, at 1056–58 (tracing
the confusion to inconsistent terminology among lower courts).
56
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have recently added clarity by explaining the distinction between
completion and supplementation.64
When a plaintiff argues for completion, he is arguing that
there are materials that should have been properly included in
the administrative record but were excluded by the agency.65 In
other words, the materials in question were actually considered
by the agency during the decision-making process but were either
unintentionally or intentionally left out of the record submitted
to the court. Given the presumption of regularity, courts generally
require plaintiffs to show “clear evidence” that the materials in
question were actually considered by the agency and, thus, should
have been included.66 Even scholars who are otherwise skeptical
of broad exceptions to the record rule are generally supportive of
a plaintiff’s ability to complete the record if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the agency actually considered other materials
in the first place.67
Motions to supplement the record are more controversial.68
When a plaintiff argues for supplementation, he is arguing that
there are materials outside the proper scope of the administrative
record—materials that the agency itself did not consider in making its decision—that courts should nonetheless consider when
reviewing the agency action.69 This category of extra-record evidence includes materials that were not before the agency during
the decision-making process as well as internal materials that are
only tangentially related to the questioned decision.70 This could
include public statements by a government official,71 related
64 See, e.g., Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 290 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2018) (clarifying
the difference between supplementation and completion and noting the “confusion” surrounding the terminology).
65 See Alter, supra note 29, at 1057.
66 See id. at 1057 (quoting Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
67 See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 32.
68 See, e.g., Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 42–44 (critiquing supplementation as
an “[i]mproper [m]eans” of adding documents to an administrative record).
69 See Alter, supra note 29, at 1057–58.
70 I use the term “extra-record evidence” to refer to all kinds of evidence that plaintiffs may seek to add to the record through supplementation. This may or may not include
discovery, which is necessarily more invasive. Some commentators define “discovery” in
the administrative record context to include both supplementation and traditional discovery. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 25 n.164. My arguments about extra-record
evidence apply to all evidence added through record supplementation, regardless of
whether traditional discovery is involved.
71 See, e.g., Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (endorsing the plaintiffs’ argument that the
Court should consider President Trump’s campaign statements on Mexican immigrants).
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emails exchanged by government officials,72 documents considered by the agency in similar decisions,73 or documents produced
after the agency made the questioned decision.74 Sometimes,
plaintiffs simply ask for “discovery in general.”75
Plaintiffs seeking record supplementation are generally trying to show that an agency’s stated explanation for its decision
was not the true motivating factor or that politics or animus improperly influenced the decision-making process. Extra-record evidence can be used to bolster an arbitrary and capricious claim
since it can indicate that the agency committed a “clear error of
judgment,” “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider,” or “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.”76 Scholars continue to debate the virtue of motions to supplement the record as well as the virtues of the record rule more
broadly.77
When deciding whether a plaintiff may supplement the record, lower courts generally apply the “strong showing of bad faith
or improper behavior” standard first articulated by the Supreme
72 See, e.g., Cook County v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Miller’s
emails with high-ranking DHS officials show his involvement with the Rule, [but] the administrative record includes no such communications.”).
73 See City of Dania Beach v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 628 F.3d 581, 590 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“The petitioners [seek] to supplement the administrative record with hundreds
of pages of documents introduced in prior EIS processes that contemplated the airport
expansion.”).
74 See Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We hold
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to supplement the
record. [The letters that the plaintiffs were seeking to include] were written after the
[agency] issued its Reconsidered Finding, and are therefore not part of the administrative
record.”).
75 Grill v. Quinn, No. CIV S-10-0757, 2012 WL 174873, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012).
76 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (quotation marks omitted) (identifying factors that would make an agency action
arbitrary and capricious).
77 The scholarly discussion can be divided into two camps. One camp supports a rigid
application of the record rule with no, or very little, extra-record supplementation. See,
e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
78–79 (1975) (proposing a record-making procedure that, in today’s terms, would not allow
any extra-record supplementation); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 26 (arguing for a
rigid interpretation of the record rule as consistent with the text of the APA). The other
camp has argued that a rigid record rule provides too much cover to agencies, imposes too
much of a burden on plaintiffs, and frustrates judicial review. See, e.g., Steven Stark &
Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of
Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 359 (1984) (arguing that the record rule
“ignore[s] the realities of informal agency decisionmaking”); Alter, supra note 29, at 1049
(arguing for an “expansive construction of the record rule”). My approach to the record
rule for constitutional challenges, discussed in Parts III and IV, generally aligns with the
former.
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Court in Overton Park.78 In this 1971 decision, the Court reversed
and remanded an APA case after a lower court based its decision
on affidavits presented by the Secretary after litigation had already begun.79 These affidavits, the Court held, were “merely ‘post
hoc’ rationalizations” and thus “an inadequate basis for review.”80
The Court remanded for the district court to decide the case on
the full administrative record.81 It left open the possibility of requiring agency officials to give testimony explaining their decision but cautioned that such “inquiry into the mental processes of
administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided.”82 Only
after a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” may
such an inquiry be made.83
Some scholars have criticized the Overton Park “bad faith”
language as having no basis in the text of the APA and as confusing in application.84 Indeed, the Court has never fully explained
what is required to make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.85 In his partial concurrence in Department of
Commerce, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justices Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, questioned the “legitimacy and
scope” of the Overton Park exception and noted that it “may warrant future consideration.”86 Moreover, lower courts rarely find
the Overton Park exception satisfied.87 Nonetheless, a majority of
the Court in Department of Commerce affirmed the Overton Park
standard as a “narrow exception” to the rule against supplementing the record.88 Thus, the Overton Park exception still stands,
despite the criticism.
Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt,89 a Western District of Wisconsin decision, involves a rare example of a court
holding that plaintiffs satisfied the Overton Park bad faith
78

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
See id. at 406, 409.
80 Id. at 419.
81 Id. at 420.
82 Id.
83 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
84 See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 44 (“[The Overton Park exception] has no
textual grounding in the APA and was created by the Court, without citation or explanation, to facilitate Article III review.”).
85 See id. at 22 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420).
86 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2579 n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
87 Cromley & Showalter, supra note 21 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of courts have
declined to use Overton Park’s exception to look beyond the administrative record.”).
88 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74.
89 961 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
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exception. The case involved a group of Chippewa Indians who
submitted applications to the Department of the Interior to convert a greyhound racing facility into a casino.90 The Department
denied their application, citing opposition from the surrounding
communities.91 Plaintiffs moved to supplement the administrative record, arguing there was “improper political influence” on
the Department’s decision.92 To substantiate this claim of bad
faith, and push it over the “strong showing” line required by Overton Park, plaintiffs cited several suspicious communications between opposition tribes, legislators, lobbyists, and the Secretary
of the Interior’s staff, as well as procedural irregularities in the
Department’s actions.93 Ultimately, the court granted plaintiffs’
motion to supplement the record, finding that the plaintiffs raised
a “substantial suspicion” of bad faith or improper behavior.94 This
case indicates that, in order to make a strong showing of bad
faith, plaintiffs may be required to offer the court a preview of the
evidence with which they hope to supplement the record. If the
Chippewa court had denied the plaintiffs’ motion to supplement,
their citations to the suspicious communications would not have
been included in the record and, thus, would not have been considered by the court on the merits.
Though it has explicitly endorsed only the Overton Park exception, the Supreme Court has also implied that supplementation is appropriate where an agency gives such an inadequate explanation of administrative action that it frustrates judicial
review.95 The exception can be traced back to Camp v. Pitts, where
the Court vacated a circuit court’s order for a trial de novo after a
Comptroller offered an inadequate explanation for his denial of a
bank charter.96 The Court explained that if “there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial review,” the lower court should “obtain from the agency . . .
such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision
as may prove necessary.”97 The Court may have been referring to
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1281–84.
Chippewa, 961 F. Supp. at 1286.
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142–43.
Id. at 139–40, 143.
Id. at 142–43; cf. Fla. Power & Light, 470 U.S. at 744:

[I]f the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on
the basis of the record before it, the proper course . . . is to remand to the agency
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record completion, but some lower courts have interpreted this
language in the context of record supplementation.98 The Court
did not mention the “failure to explain” exception in Department
of Commerce, and some scholars have criticized it as “contrary to
the APA.”99 Moreover, an agency actively seeking to frustrate judicial review would necessarily be exhibiting bad faith as well.
But the Court has never explicitly foreclosed a “failure to explain”
exception to the record rule.
While the Overton Park bad faith exception stands as the general rule for extra-record evidence, the circuits have applied the
exception in varying and sometimes contradictory ways.100 The
D.C. Circuit, for example, has recognized three “unusual circumstances” that will justify record supplementation:
(1) the agency deliberately or negligently excluded documents
that may have been adverse to its decision; (2) the district
court needed to supplement the record with background information in order to determine whether the agency considered
all of the relevant factors; or (3) the agency failed to explain
administrative action so as to frustrate judicial review.101
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has recognized four exceptions that overlap with the D.C. Circuit’s three exceptions in varying ways. First, extra-record evidence is permissible if it is “necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all
relevant factors and has explained its decision.”102 This overlaps
with the D.C. Circuit’s second and third exceptions. Second, extrarecord evidence is permissible if the agency “relied on documents
not in the record.”103 This is properly understood as completion of
the record, not supplementation, yet another indication of the
for additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to
reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.
98

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 772 (1st Cir. 1992).
Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 52; cf. Travis O. Brandon, Reforming the ExtraRecord Evidence Rule in Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Informal Agency Actions: A
New Procedural Approach, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 981, 1005 (2017) (critiquing the
“failure to explain” exception as potentially overinclusive).
100 See Brandon, supra note 99, at 995.
101 Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Kempthorne, 530 F.3d at 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
102 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443,
1450 (9th Cir. 1996)) (quotation marks omitted).
103 Id. (quoting Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450) (quotation marks
omitted).
99
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confusion that has garbled this area of law. Third, extra-record
evidence is permissible if it is “necessary to explain technical
terms or complex subject matter,”104 an exception unique to the
Ninth Circuit and with little basis in the Overton Park bad faith
standard. Finally, extra-record evidence is permissible if the
“plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith,”105 a clear homage
to Overton Park. Despite these varying approaches from the circuits, the Supreme Court’s most recent statement is fairly clear:
extra-record evidence is allowed only with a strong showing of bad
faith or improper behavior.106
II. THE RECORD RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
AGENCY ACTION
This Part introduces the legal question at the heart of this
Comment: whether the record rule applies to constitutional challenges to administrative agency action. Part II.A discusses how
constitutional claims differ from arbitrary and capricious claims
and introduces the evidentiary question raised by constitutional
claims. Part II.B traces the Supreme Court’s limited treatment of
the question, concluding that the Court has never offered a clear
answer. Finally, Part II.C discusses the divergent approaches of
the lower courts, dividing them into three buckets.
A. Constitutional Challenges and the APA
Courts consistently apply some version of the record rule to
arbitrary and capricious challenges to agency action. The specific
exceptions vary across circuits, but the general idea is the same:
unless plaintiffs make a substantial showing under one of the specified exceptions, they may not supplement the administrative record with new evidence. When a plaintiff challenges an agency action on constitutional grounds, the picture becomes more
complicated.
I assume, for purposes of this Comment, that the APA provides the statutory vehicle for most constitutional challenges to
agency action. After all, the text of the APA treats constitutional

104 Id. (quoting Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450) (quotation marks
omitted).
105 Id. (quoting Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450) (quotation marks
omitted).
106 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420).
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claims no differently than arbitrary and capricious claims.107
Moreover, other vehicles for allegations of constitutional violations,
like Bivens actions, are not applicable in the administrative
agency context.108 There is also a strong case that, unless brought
under a separate statutory scheme, constitutional challenges to
agency action are necessarily subsumed by the APA’s judicial review provisions.
Congress may channel judicial review of constitutional
claims through a specific statutory scheme.109 For example, the
Court has affirmed that Congress may limit judicial review of adverse action against federal employees to the Federal Circuit,
even for employees who raise constitutional issues.110 The APA’s
judicial review provisions should be viewed in the same light.
Channeling constitutional claims through the APA does not “deny
any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”111 and thus
does not raise the “serious constitutional question” that would
arise if Congress sought to “preclude judicial review of constitutional claims.”112 In fact, the APA guarantees a forum for constitutional claims113 but also limits the extent to which courts may
meddle in the proper functioning of administrative agencies.
Moreover, if constitutional challenges were available outside the
APA context, plaintiffs might always opt for a constitutional

107 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law; [or] contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.”).
108 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1994) (holding that Bivens actions for
constitutional violations may not be brought against federal agencies, only against individual federal agents).
109 Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 8–10 (2012) (indicating that a statute that
denies “any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim” is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny, but not a statute that “simply channels judicial review of a constitutional
claim to a particular court”) (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)).
110 See id. at 13–14.
111 Webster, 486 U.S. at 603.
112 Id. (quotation marks omitted). In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia questioned
whether a “serious constitutional question” would arise if plaintiffs were denied a forum
in federal court for colorable constitutional claims. Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 603) (quotation marks omitted). He noted that “not all constitutional claims require a judicial remedy” and criticized the idea that “every constitutional claim is ipso
facto more worthy, and every statutory claim less worthy, of judicial review.” Id. at 614,
619. Thus, perhaps the Webster majority’s concern for ensuring some judicial forum for all
constitutional claims is overstated.
113 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (entitling any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action” to “judicial review thereof”).
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challenge over an arbitrary and capricious challenge to avoid the
APA’s procedural hurdles, including the record rule.114
Though the APA expressly contemplates constitutional challenges to agency action, many courts have found that constitutional claims are too fundamental to be limited by the APA’s
judicial review provisions. Because constitutional claims necessarily implicate the fundamental rights of individuals, the argument goes, courts should not “abandon their independent vigilance on . . . constitutional matters simply because a federal
agency is involved.”115 Thus, constitutional challenges to agency
action require an “independent assessment,” and judicial review
should not be bound by the APA’s restrictions.116 Supreme Court
precedent provides some support for the general notion that issues
of constitutional rights require a harder look.117 The open question is whether, in the administrative record context, the special gravity of constitutional claims trumps the APA’s procedural requirements.
B. The Supreme Court’s Limited Treatment
The Supreme Court has occasionally touched on this topic in
dicta but has never confronted it directly. Some lower courts have
mistakenly interpreted Pickering v. Board of Education118 to suggest that extra-record evidence should always be allowed in constitutional challenges to agency action.119 In reviewing a state
court record, the Court noted that “where constitutional rights
are [at] issue[,] an independent examination of the record will be
made in order that the controlling legal principles may be applied
to the actual facts of the case.”120 While the sentiment may, as a
matter of principle, seem applicable to the present topic—whether
constitutional claims deserve a harder look than APA claims—the
114 Ultimately, the specific question of whether a plaintiff may bring a constitutional
challenge to agency action outside of the APA is beyond the scope of this Comment.
115 Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 781 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979).
116 Id. at 780; see also Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900, 905 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Independent of any power of review that Congress granted to this Court under the APA, this
Court has the authority to examine and rule on any actions of a federal agency that allegedly violate the Constitution.” (citing Porter, 592 F.2d at 780)).
117 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60, 64 (1932) (holding that courts reviewing agency adjudications that involve constitutional issues must engage in an “independent determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of
that supreme function”).
118 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
119 See, e.g., Porter, 592 F.2d at 781; Rydeen, 748 F. Supp. at 906.
120 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 578 n.2.
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Pickering Court was speaking in the context of a state court record,
not an administrative record.121 The case has nothing to do with
administrative law or the APA and is therefore inapposite.
The Court inched closest to the present question in Webster
v. Doe.122 The case involved a former CIA employee who alleged
that he had been fired by the CIA because of his sexual orientation.123 The plaintiff challenged his firing under the APA as an
arbitrary and capricious agency decision and as a violation of his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.124 The
Court’s holding was twofold: (1) the National Security Act of 1947
(NSA) commits individual employment decisions to the CIA Director’s discretion, thus precluding judicial review of those specific decisions under APA § 701(a),125 but (2) the NSA does not preclude judicial review of “colorable constitutional claims arising
out of the actions of the Director” in exercising that discretion.126
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist addressed
the CIA’s concerns that “judicial review [ ] of constitutional claims
will entail extensive ‘rummaging around’ in the Agency’s affairs
to the detriment of national security.”127 Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that district courts have “the latitude to control any discovery process which may be instituted so as to balance respondent’s
need for access to proof which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for
confidentiality and the protection of its methods, sources, and
mission.”128
Some lower courts have erroneously cited Webster for the
proposition that extra-record evidence should be allowed in constitutional challenges to agency action.129 For several reasons,
121

See id. (discussing the deference owed to state court findings).
486 U.S. 592 (1988).
123 Id. at 595–96.
124 Id. at 596.
125 Id. at 601.
126 Id. at 603–04. At first blush, this holding suggests that the Court is willing to
review constitutional challenges to agency action outside of the APA § 706 context, thus
calling into question my assumption in Part II.A. However, the Webster Court seemed to
assume that the APA is the vehicle for the plaintiff’s constitutional claims. It cited APA
§ 701(a) for the proposition that claims are removed from judicial review only if “specifically identified by Congress or committed to agency discretion by law.” Id. at 603. Thus,
the Court assumed that the APA’s review procedures still apply to constitutional claims,
even though it allowed the constitutional claim to proceed.
127 Webster, 486 U.S. at 604 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument 8–13).
128 Id.
129 See P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d
310, 328 (D.P.R. 1999) (“The . . . Court has held that a plaintiff who is entitled to judicial
122
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however, Webster is less helpful than it may first appear. First,
the Court’s aside on discovery is dicta. The Court was primarily
responding to concerns, raised by the CIA in its briefs, about the
scope of judicial review as it relates to the sensitive activities of
an intelligence agency—not to concerns about the scope of judicial
review for constitutional claims in general.130 Second, Webster is
somewhat limited to its facts because it relates to the decisions of
the CIA Director—an agency decisionmaker, no doubt, but one
insulated by the NSA with broad discretionary authority.131 Because its facts are so unusual, Webster provides little guidance on
the present question.
In fact, Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Webster is more
relevant to the present discussion than the majority opinion is. In
it, he emphasized that the APA “is an umbrella statute governing
judicial review of all federal agency action.”132 In Justice Scalia’s
view, “[w]hile a right to judicial review of agency action may be
created by a separate statutory or constitutional provision, once
created it becomes subject to the judicial review provisions of the
APA unless specifically excluded.”133 This accords with the general understanding of the APA as setting the default rules for
agency action.134 Congress and agencies may adopt procedures to
supplement or replace the APA’s requirements, but if they do not
do so clearly, the APA controls. This suggests that some form of
the record rule should apply to all challenges to agency action, not
just arbitrary and capricious challenges.
Two recent Supreme Court cases have involved constitutional challenges to administrative agency action and the scope of
review: Department of Commerce and Regents, both discussed in
this Comment’s introduction.135 Department of Commerce

review of its constitutional claims under the APA is entitled to discovery in connection
with those claims.”).
130 Brief for Petitioner at 37, Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1998) (No. 86-1294), 1987
WL 881344, at *37 (expressing concerns about “litigation that could require the government
to disclose secrets potentially damaging to vital national interests”).
131 See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1985) (“[Through the NSA], Congress
vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of
intelligence information from disclosure.”).
132 Webster, 486 U.S. at 607 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (emphasis in original).
134 See Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 630 (2017) (describing the APA as setting “the default rules that govern the federal regulatory state”).
135 See supra notes 5–14 and accompanying text.
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analyzed the proposed citizenship question on the 2020 Census.
Regents struck down President Trump’s rescission of DACA.
In Department of Commerce, the Court strongly affirmed
Overton Park’s record-rule doctrine. Noting that “judicial inquiry
into ‘executive motivation’ represents ‘a substantial intrusion’
into the workings of another branch of Government and should
normally be avoided,”136 the Court affirmed that judges are “ordinarily limited to evaluating the agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing administrative record.”137 The Court
also affirmed the “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” exception as the one “narrow exception to the general rule
against inquiring into ‘the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers.’” 138 The Court found that, because the plaintiffs had
not made a strong showing of bad faith, the lower court’s extrarecord discovery order was technically premature.139 But the
Court went on to find, puzzlingly, that the discovery order was
“ultimately justified” because the new materials indicated that
some of the Secretary’s stated justifications for the new policy
were pretextual.140
In his partial dissent, Justice Thomas took issue with this
reasoning. He argued that, because the plaintiffs did not actually
make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior, they
were not entitled to extra-record discovery.141 Justice Thomas argued that information revealed from improperly granted extrarecord discovery cannot justify record supplementation after the
fact.142
The Court found that the Secretary’s insufficient explanation
for the decision warranted remand.143 Thus, the Court did not
reach the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge. The Court therefore did not directly consider whether the same evidentiary standard should apply to a constitutional claim as opposed to an
136 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 & n.18 (1977)).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 2572–73 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420).
139 Id. at 2573.
140 Id. at 2573–74; see also Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records
After Department of Commerce v. New York, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 87, 93 (2020) (criticizing
the decision for, among other reasons, not explaining “what, precisely, in the completed
record met the Overton Park standard and thus justified supplementation”).
141 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2580 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
142 See id.
143 See id. at 2576.
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arbitrary and capricious claim. Nonetheless, a majority of the
Court agreed that “bad faith or improper behavior” was one “narrow exception” to the general presumption against extra-record
evidence.144 If the Court means what it says, the presence of constitutional claims should not affect this bright-line rule.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s partial concurrence in Regents
took a different approach. In Regents, the Court struck down the
Trump administration’s rescission of DACA as arbitrary and capricious.145 However, the Court rejected the respondents’ equal
protection challenge to the rescission because it found their allegations “insufficient.”146 More specifically, the Court held that the
respondents failed to “raise a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by animus.”147 The scope of the record was not
at issue in the case, but Justice Sotomayor raised the issue in a
separate opinion.148
Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s approach to
the equal protection issue. Arguing that the respondents plausibly alleged discriminatory animus in the Trump administration’s
recission of DACA, Justice Sotomayor insisted that the respondents should have been allowed to “develop their equal protection
claim on remand.”149 Because the respondents’ complaint—which
cited President Trump’s public statements deriding Mexican immigrants—raised plausible allegations of discriminatory animus,
the viability of their equal protection claims “should be determined only after factual development on remand.”150
Justice Sotomayor implied that extra-record discovery—or at
least some review of extra-record evidence—was warranted for
the respondents’ constitutional claims against the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) without any strong showing of bad
faith or improper behavior. Though animus and bad faith are arguably one and the same, Justice Sotomayor indicated that the
plaintiffs “plausibly allege[d] discriminatory animus,” not that
they made the strong showing of bad faith required by Overton

144

Id. at 2573–74 (majority opinion).
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.
146 Id. at 1915.
147 Id. at 1916.
148 Id. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
149 Id.
150 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1918 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
145
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Park.151 Under Justice Sotomayor’s approach, the scope of evidentiary review on constitutional claims would not be bound by the
APA record rule as applied in Overton Park. Some lower courts
have similarly indicated that “equal protection principles, not the
APA, supply the governing legal framework for assessing whether
[a] plaintiff [making an equal protection challenge] is entitled to
discovery.”152 But Justice Sotomayor’s argument seems to complicate the Court’s strong endorsement of the Overton Park bad faith
exception in Department of Commerce as the only way plaintiffs
may introduce evidence beyond the administrative record. Between Department of Commerce and Justice Sotomayor’s approach in Regents, the Court’s position is unclear and, in places,
contradictory.
C. The Divergent Approaches of the Lower Courts
With little direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have largely been left to their own devices on the question of when
extra-record evidence should be considered in constitutional challenges to agency action. Moreover, the circuits have been largely
silent.153 Thus, district court judges have developed the bulk of the
caselaw on this topic. Their divergent approaches can be sorted
into three buckets.
First, some courts have applied the record-rule framework as
it is applied in the standard APA context. In other words, constitutional challenges to agency action should be treated no differently
than other challenges to agency action under APA § 706, at least
from an evidentiary perspective. I call this the “record-rule approach.” Second, some courts have taken a middle-ground approach, arguing that while the record rule should generally govern constitutional challenges to agency action, courts should be
open to going beyond the record when a plaintiff’s constitutional
claim is substantively different from their arbitrary and capricious claim. I call this the “claim-specific approach.” Finally, other
courts have reasoned that constitutional challenges are completely different from arbitrary and capricious challenges and,

151

Id. at 1917 (emphasis added).
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Trump, 429 F. Supp. 3d 128, 141 (D. Md. 2019).
153 The lack of circuit-level case law may be because extra-record supplementation
rulings are often reviewed for abuse of discretion and, thus, warrant limited discussion at
the appellate level. See, e.g., Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 709 F.3d
44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reviewing the district court’s denial of an extra-record supplementation motion for abuse of discretion).
152
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thus, should be completely divorced from the procedural framework of the APA. Under this approach, plaintiffs who bring constitutional challenges to agency action should be able to add
extra-record evidence without any record-rule restraints. I call
this the “non-record-rule approach.” I will discuss each approach
in turn.
1. The record-rule approach.
The first approach is the narrowest. It states that extra-record
evidence should be permitted in constitutional challenges to
agency action only if the plaintiff can argue for extra-record evidence under the existing record-rule exceptions. Because the exceptions vary by circuit, the exact dimensions of this approach
also vary. But, following Department of Commerce’s affirmation
of the Overton Park exception, it at least allows plaintiffs to reach
extra-record evidence for constitutional challenges if they can
make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior. Under
this approach, constitutional challenges are treated essentially
the same as claims brought under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” clause.154
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care v. Thompson,155 a case from the
District of Rhode Island, is instructive. In this case, a health organization—alleging inadequate notice of a change in Medicare
policy—brought both an APA claim and a constitutional due process claim against the Department of Health and Human Services.156 The plaintiff sought extra-record discovery on the constitutional claim, arguing that the “presence of a constitutional
claim allows for discovery of matters not included in the administrative record.”157 The plaintiff submitted nineteen interrogatories and nine requests for document production directed to the
Department of Health and Human Services, all examining the
agency’s procedures for reviewing Medicaid policy changes.158 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, holding that the mere
presence of a constitutional claim does not automatically allow an

154 See Charlton Mem’l Hosp. v. Sullivan, 816 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Mass. 1993) (“[Adding constitutional claims to an APA claim] cannot so transform the case that it ceases to
be primarily a case involving judicial review of agency action.”).
155 318 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.R.I. 2004).
156 Id. at 5.
157 Id. at 10.
158 Id. at 5.
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APA plaintiff to reach extra-record discovery.159 Judge Ronald
Lagueux reasoned that the “APA’s restriction of judicial review to
the administrative record would be meaningless if any party seeking review based on . . . constitutional deficiencies was entitled to
broad-ranging discovery.”160
A District of New Mexico court took a similar approach in
Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n v. United States Forest Service.161 There, a cattle farmers’ association challenged the U.S.
Forest Service’s decision to reduce the number of livestock grazing permits available in a national forest.162 The farmers brought
APA and First Amendment claims and sought discovery on the
latter.163 As in Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, the court rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument, holding that their First Amendment
claim “is subject to the APA’s procedural provisions.”164 Thus, the
plaintiffs could reach extra-record evidence only by making a
“compelling factual showing” to meet the bad faith exception to
the record rule.165
2. The claim-specific approach.
The second bucket includes several different approaches that
involve looking to the specific nature of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim to resolve evidentiary questions. Courts using this
middle-ground approach have most often allowed extra-record evidence when the plaintiff’s constitutional claim was fundamentally different from the plaintiff’s APA claim or when a constitutional claim challenged the procedure as opposed to the substance
of an agency decision.

159

Id. at 10.
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
161 58 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D.N.M. 2014).
162 Id. at 1205.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1237; see also N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1174 (D. Wyo.
2015) (holding that the court “must limit its constitutional review of [an agency] adjudication to the administrative record”); Almaklani v. Trump, 444 F. Supp. 3d 425, 434
(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[T]he addition of constitutional claims does not alter the sufficiency of
the record.”).
165 Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1240. The court recognized
that the Tenth Circuit only explicitly allows for supplementation in the context of adjudication. See id. at 1239 n.13. To facilitate review, the court stated that it would borrow the
Ninth Circuit’s four exceptions, see supra note 102–07 and accompanying text, but noted
that the bad faith exception is the “only one in which the Court can reasonably foresee
permitting discovery.” Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1239–40.
160
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In J.L. v. Cissna,166 for example, a Northern District of California court rejected the plaintiffs’ discovery request on a due process claim because it “substantially overlap[ped] with Plaintiffs’
APA claims.”167 The court noted that, “[w]hile there is no brightline rule, extra-record discovery is generally limited to cases
where the constitutional claim does not overlap with the APA
claim or the substance of an agency decision.”168 The court found
that the plaintiffs’ due process claim (that the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services’ failure to evaluate their immigration
petitions in accordance with federal law deprived them of liberty
and property interests) substantially overlapped with their APA
claim (that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not following proper immigration law).169 The court then
turned to the question of whether the plaintiffs could nevertheless reach extra-record discovery through one of the Ninth Circuit’s recognized exceptions to the record rule.170 Because the
plaintiffs had not shown that any of the exceptions applied, the
court rejected discovery on the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.171
Other cases have distinguished between constitutional
claims that challenge the substantive of an agency decision and
those that challenge the procedure used to reach that decision. In
Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States,172 for example, Judge James
Boasberg of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia identified a “common thread” running through the
many related lower court cases: “[W]hen a constitutional challenge to agency action requires evaluating the substance of an
agency’s decision made on an administrative record, th[e] challenge must be judged on the record before the agency.”173 On the
other hand, when the constitutional challenge requires

166

No. 18-cv-04914, 2019 WL 2224851 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019).
Id. at *1.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at *2. For the Ninth Circuit’s exceptions to the record rule, see supra notes 102–
07 and accompanying text.
171 J.L., 2019 WL 2224851, at *3; see also Chiayu Chang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs, 254 F. Supp. 3d 160, 161–62 (D.D.C. 2017) (recognizing other courts’ findings that
“where a plaintiff’s constitutional claims fundamentally overlap with their other APA
claims, discovery is neither needed nor appropriate”); California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 19-cv-04975, 2020 WL 1557424, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (granting extra-record discovery because “plaintiffs’ APA and constitutional claims . . . do not fundamentally overlap”).
172 335 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2018).
173 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
167
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evaluating “the procedures by which the agency reached its conclusion,” courts are more willing to allow extra-record evidence.174
Thus, Judge Boasberg opted for a case-specific inquiry over a
“bright line or categorical rule.”175
Similarly, a District of Connecticut court has ruled that
where “a plaintiff challenges an agency’s general course of conduct rather than a discrete adjudication, limited discovery outside
of the administrative record may be necessary where the administrative record does not contain evidence of the challenged action.”176 An example might be a claim that an agency engaged in
discriminatory behavior when issuing a rule. Any evidence of discrimination would likely have been initially excluded from the
record. The court noted that discovery should be permitted only
where “necessary to effectuate the Court’s judicial review,”177
channeling the Supreme Court’s suggestion, in Camp, that extrarecord discovery may be necessary when there is “such failure to
explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial
review.”178
3. The non-record-rule approach.
Finally, some district courts have held that extra-record evidence is presumptively allowable when plaintiffs mount constitutional challenges to agency action. Under this approach, constitutional challenges are altogether different from regular APA
challenges and, thus, are not limited by the record rule. This reflects the notion, expressed in Pickering, that “where constitutional rights are [at] issue an independent examination of the record will be made.”179
An Eastern District of California court’s reasoning in Grill v.
Quinn180 is instructive. In Grill, the plaintiff sued after the U.S.
Forest Service denied his permit to build a bridge across a
stream.181 The plaintiff alleged that the Forest Service’s permit
review process violated the APA and procedural due process.182
The court granted the plaintiff’s request for discovery on his
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rydeen, 748 F. Supp. at 906).
Id.
Kennedy v. Speer, No. 16cv2010, slip op. at 3 (D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2019).
Id.
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142–43.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 578 n.2.
No. CIV S-10-0757, 2012 WL 174873 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
See id. at *3–4.
Id. at *1.
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constitutional claim, asserting, matter-of-factly, that “[a] direct
constitutional challenge is reviewed independent of the APA. As
such, the court is entitled to look beyond the administrative record in regard to this claim. Therefore, discovery as to the non-APA
claim is permissible.”183
Cook County v. Wolf,184 a Northern District of Illinois case,
offers an emphatic non-record-rule holding. The case involved a
challenge brought by Cook County, Illinois, and an immigrants’
rights organization against the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to add to the number of public benefits that can
make an immigrant ineligible for permanent resident status.185
The plaintiffs brought two claims. They argued that the rule was
incompatible with DHS’s statutory authority, thus violating the
APA, and that the rule violated their equal protection rights.186
The plaintiffs also sought extra-record discovery to substantiate
their constitutional claims.187 Namely, they sought to supplement
the record with emails exchanged by Trump administration officials suggesting that the public charge rule was implemented to
disproportionately suppress nonwhite immigration.188
The court held that the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims
were “entitled to discovery . . . regardless of whether [plaintiff]
can satisfy the ‘strong showing’ standard applicable to APA
claims.”189 The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims were grounded in allegations of racial animus,
they required extra-record discovery: “[I]f a facially neutral
agency action is motivated by racial animus, that animus almost
certainly will not be ‘disclose[d]’ in the agency’s ‘contemporaneous
explanation’ for that action.”190 Under this approach, the scope of
evidentiary review for a challenge to agency action depends not
on the APA’s procedural requirements but on the legal argument
plaintiffs choose to deploy.

183 Id. at *2 (citations omitted); see also Mayor & City Council of Balt., 429 F. Supp.
3d at 141 (holding that, on an equal protection claim against agency action, “equal protection principles, not the APA, supply the governing legal framework for assessing whether
plaintiff is entitled to discovery”).
184 461 F. Supp. 3d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
185 Id. at 782–84.
186 Id. at 782.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 795–96.
189 Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 795.
190 Id. at 794–95 (second alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573).
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III. THE LEGAL CASE FOR A RECORD-RULE APPROACH
This Comment argues that the record-rule approach191 is preferable for doctrinal and policy reasons. The APA record rule, as
articulated in Overton Park and recently reaffirmed in Department
of Commerce, should apply to constitutional challenges to agency
action just as it applies to all other lawsuits brought under APA
§ 706. In other words, courts should not allow extra-record evidence in constitutional challenges as a matter of course. Their review must be limited, in most cases, to the administrative record
submitted by the agency. To go beyond the record, plaintiffs must
make a strong showing of agency bad faith or improper behavior.
While courts should apply the record rule to constitutional
challenges to agency action, they also should read the record rule
to include a robust bad faith exception, particularly as applied to
constitutional claims. Thus, this Comment diverges from scholars
who have both argued for a rigid application of the record rule
and criticized the Overton Park bad faith exception.192 A robust
bad faith exception should encompass an exception for a bare record that unduly frustrates judicial review. While the Supreme
Court has never made clear that a bare record or a frustration of
judicial review would trigger the bad faith exception, it contemplated as much in Overton Park and Camp. Any approach to extrarecord evidence in constitutional challenges must balance the
competing interests of agencies and individual plaintiffs. The
proper standard must protect agencies against burdensome discovery and litigation while ensuring that plaintiffs receive thorough review of their constitutional claims. A robust bad faith exception—one which encompasses an exception for a bare record—
balances these competing interests.
191

See supra Part II.C.1.
See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 44. Though I agree with Professor Aram
Gavoor and Steven Platt’s reading of the APA’s “whole record” language to strictly limit
judicial review of agency action to the administrative record, I disagree with their assessment of the Overton Park bad faith exception. They argue that the Overton Park exception
“has no textual grounding in the APA and was created by the Court, without citation or
explanation, to facilitate Article III review.” Id. For reasons discussed in Part III.D, I argue that a robust bad faith exception is consistent with the APA’s direction for courts to
engage in thorough judicial review of agency action. Gavoor and Platt also suggest that
plaintiffs may be able to circumvent the record rule by bringing “constitutional or nonAPA claims challenging agency action and claim those arguments exempt them from the
record rule.” Id. at 42. They do not discuss the application of the record rule to constitutional challenges any further. Perhaps they were simply mentioning the argument because many plaintiffs have raised it in court filings, not because they wanted to weigh in
on the question.
192
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In this Part, I will consider the text and legislative history of
the APA, Supreme Court precedent predating the APA, and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA to argue for a recordrule approach.
A. APA Text
The APA provides a cause of action for aggrieved parties to sue
governmental agencies193 and delineates the full scope of judicial
review of agency action.194 If an aggrieved party brings suit against
an administrative agency under the APA, the statute requires that
the reviewing court “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”195
In addition to the oft-cited “arbitrary [and] capricious” standard,196 as well as the “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard used for formal rulemaking and adjudication,197 the APA also
directs courts to set aside agency action that is “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.”198 Thus, the APA
explicitly contemplates constitutional challenges to agency action
and includes these claims in its procedural framework. In the
same section, the APA prescribes the boundaries of this review:
“In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”199 This is the
source of the record-rule evidentiary limitation, first articulated
in Overton Park. It is an essential aspect of judicial review of
agency action, and the plain text of the APA does not limit its
application only to certain claims. Rather, all judicial review of
agency action, regardless of the specific § 706 cause of action, is
subject to the same procedure by the plain text of the APA. Thus,
all challenges to agency action brought under the APA are subject
to the “whole record” limitation.200
193

5 U.S.C. § 702.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
195 5 U.S.C. § 706.
196 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
197 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
198 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).
199 5 U.S.C. § 706.
200 One could argue that the “whole record” language merely establishes an evidentiary floor, not a ceiling. See supra note 46. In other words, courts must review the record,
but they also may review material beyond the record if need be. However, following the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express inclusion of a clear direction to
194
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B. APA Legislative History
The legislative history of the APA lends support to a restrictive interpretation of this “whole record” limitation and its applicability to every type of judicial review of agency action. Some
may object to the use of APA legislative history as an interpretive
aid, given that the statute emerged as a painstaking compromise
between liberals and conservatives after years of post–New Deal
political strife.201 However, APA legislative history may still be a
useful, albeit blunt, interpretive tool. It may not provide much
help in interpreting specific textual provisions, as these may have
been obsessively tinkered with in the drafting process, but it can
give us a sense of the general motivation behind the judicial review procedures, as seen below. Thus, we should not expect legislative history to provide a convincing definition of “whole record”
and how it should apply to constitutional challenges.202 However,
we can discern two general themes from the contentious debate
over the APA’s passage.
First, the APA was intended to solidify the procedure governing judicial review of every legal wrong stemming from agency
action. Envisioning the APA as dealing with “the very important
problem of the relation of the courts to administrative agencies,”203 the drafters sought to enshrine a comprehensive framework for this relationship through the APA’s judicial review procedures. As Representative Francis Walter, chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Administrative Law, stated:
[The judicial review section] is a comprehensive statement of
the right, mechanics, and scope of judicial review. . . . It is a
means of enforcing all forms of law and all types of legal limitations. Every form of statutory right or limitation would

review the “whole record or those parts of it cited by the parties” suggests the exclusion of
other potential evidentiary sources.
201 See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
202 Indeed, the drafters provided little direct discussion of the “whole record” provision. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary did note that the “requirement of review
upon ‘the whole record’ means that courts may not look only to the case presented by one
party, since other evidence may weaken or even indisputably destroy that case.” S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. No. 79-752, at 28 (1945).
This comment seems to be motivated by a concern that judges, when reviewing agency
action, might unfairly prejudice either the plaintiff or the defendant agency by reviewing
only parts of the record instead of the whole record.
203 92 CONG. REC. S2148 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1946) (statement of Sen. Smith).
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thus be subject to judicial review under the bill. It would not
be limited to constitutional rights or limitations alone.204
In other words, the APA is “a simplified statement of judicial review designed to afford a remedy for every legal wrong.”205 Moreover, the drafters seemed to assume that questions of constitutional rights or limitations would be included in the APA’s scope.
The modern assumption underlying the non-record-rule approach—that constitutional claims are somehow immune from
the APA’s judicial review provisions—would have been foreign to
the APA’s drafters.
Second, the APA was not intended to broaden the scope of
judicial review of agency action beyond the boundaries already
developed by courts in pre-APA cases. Pursuant to this understanding, I discuss some of these pre-APA cases in the following
section. At the time, many scholars and practitioners were concerned that the “on the whole record” language would broaden
courts’ review powers well beyond the pre-APA norm.206 The drafters thus sought to reassure opponents that the judicial review
procedures did not “expand the scope of judicial review, nor reduce it directly by implication.”207 Instead, the drafters were
simply trying to codify existing judicial review procedure: “The
provisions of this section are technical but involve no departure
from the usual and well understood rules of procedure in this
field.”208 This included the widely accepted notion that questions
of fact should be left to the agency while “questions of law are for
courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis.”209 It
also included some version of the record rule that the Supreme
Court had developed in its pre-APA precedent, as I discuss in the
following Section.210
These two themes suggest a minimalist approach to extrarecord evidence questions. Courts should view the APA as

204

92 CONG. REC. H5654 (daily ed. May 24, 1946) (statement of Rep. Walter).
92 CONG. REC. S2151 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
206 Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 207, 222 (2016).
207 92 CONG. REC. S2163 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1946) (quoting Allen Moore, The Proposed
Administrative Procedure Act, 22 DICTA 1, 14–15 (1945)); see also Elias, supra note 206, at
222 (“Responsive testimony made it unequivocally clear that the purpose of the phrase
[‘on the whole record’] was not to broaden the review powers of the court . . . to any extent.”
(quotation marks omitted)).
208 92 CONG. REC. H5654 (daily ed. May 24, 1946) (statement of Rep. Walter).
209 S. REP. No. 752, at 28 (1945).
210 See supra notes 206–10.
205

1542

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

intended—a complete statement of judicial review of agency action.211 The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment, noting, in
a different context, that the APA “sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural
correctness.”212 If it truly offers the full framework for judicial review of agency action, then courts should apply the APA’s judicial
review provisions to every claim that arises under its auspices,
including claims that agency action was “contrary to constitutional right.”213 A plain reading of the text of the APA, informed
by legislative history, suggests that constitutional challenges to
agency action cannot be separated from the APA’s procedural
structure. Rather, constitutional claims and arbitrary and capricious claims should be treated as procedurally synonymous.
C. Pre-APA Precedent
Administrative law did not begin with the APA.214 Indeed, as
discussed above, the drafters of the APA sought to complement
the recognized norms of judicial review of agency action.215 Thus,
a thoughtful application of the APA should consider and seek to
incorporate those contemporary norms.
By the time of the APA’s passage in 1946, the Supreme Court
had developed a robust administrative law jurisprudence, much
of it involving now-defunct (but once incredibly powerful) federal
211 This argument aligns with the notion of “APA originalism,” the idea that the text
of the APA—not judge-made common law—should be the foundation and focus of administrative law. See generally Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act
Originalism, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2018). See also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 119 (1998) (arguing that the text of the
APA, not administrative common law, should assume “the dominant position” in “just
about all cases reviewing federal administrative action”).
212 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (discussing the
proper standard for arbitrary and capricious review when an agency changes existing policy); cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 549
(1978) (“[Courts] should . . . not stray beyond the judicial province . . . to impose upon the
agency its own notion of which procedures are best or most likely to further some vague,
undefined public good.” (quotation marks omitted)).
213 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).
214 See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (2016) (tracing the history of federal regulation and the courts before
the passage of the APA).
215 See Elias, supra note 206, at 222 (“The legislative history shows that Congress
intended the APA’s form of judicial review to supplement, not replace, those established
forms.”). But see Bernick, supra note 211, at 815 (“In the final analysis, the APA was designed both to codify and transform. It enshrined the broad contours of judicial review
doctrine and agency practice that had developed in preceding years, but it also altered
those contours in subtle but important ways.” (emphasis in original)).

2021]

Evidentiary Review in Challenges to Agency Action

1543

agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). I will
not attempt a full review of this history, but I will highlight some
relevant themes. First, pre-APA courts often referenced some notion of a presumption of regularity for administrative action. Second, pre-APA courts often stressed what is now known as the record rule for all judicial review of agency action. Finally, while
there was much uncertainty on the proper scope of evidence for
constitutional challenges to agency action, several early opinions
suggest that one consistent evidentiary standard should be applied to all judicial review of agency action.
The Supreme Court referenced the presumption of regularity
well before the APA’s passage. In United States v. Chemical Foundation,216 the Supreme Court declared that the “presumption of
regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that
they have properly discharged their official duties.”217 In United
States v. Morgan,218 the Court took issue with a district court’s
decision to authorize livestock companies to interview and depose
the Secretary of Agriculture in connection with a rate limitation
order dispute.219 Rather, courts must respect “the integrity of the
administrative process” and refrain from “prob[ing] the mental
processes of the Secretary.”220 These principles have undergirded
post-APA jurisprudence on judicial review of agency action.
The record rule also did not begin with the APA. Some early
precedent cast doubt on the idea of courts restricting their review
of evidence to the administrative record in challenges to agency
action. In an 1896 case involving a railroad’s dispute with the ICC
over allegedly unfair rail rates, the Court rejected the notion that
“either party . . . is to be restricted to the evidence that was before
the Commission.”221 By 1918, however, the Court had changed its
tune. In another challenge brought by a railway company against
the ICC for allegedly ultra vires action, the Court held that extrarecord evidence was “clearly inadmissible . . . because, on the issues
presented, the validity of the order must be determined upon the
evidence introduced before the Commission.”222 Justice Louis
Brandeis reiterated this point in a later case involving allegedly
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

272 U.S. 1 (1926).
Id. at 14–15.
313 U.S. 409 (1941).
See id. at 413–14.
Id. at 422 (quotation marks omitted).
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896).
Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. United States, 245 U.S. 463, 466 (1918).
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confiscatory water rates.223 He reasoned that once an agency established a record of all evidence consulted during its decision-making
process, “[n]o additional evidence may be introduced” in the reviewing court.224 Thus, by the time the APA was drafted, judges
and practitioners likely recognized something akin to the modernday record rule governing judicial review of agency action.
Finally, pre-APA courts occasionally dealt with constitutional challenges to agency action, but their treatment of these
cases, at least with respect to the record rule question, was inconsistent. In Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States,225 the Supreme Court suggested that there might be a different evidentiary standard for constitutional challenges to agency action. The
case involved a challenge to the validity of an order from the Secretary of Agriculture fixing tariff rates.226 The Court dismissed all
claims and held that the lower court should not have allowed evidence beyond the record submitted by the Secretary.227 In its ruling, the Court reiterated the record rule but offered a caveat:
The validity of an order of the Secretary, like that of an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, must be determined upon the record of the proceedings before him[ ]—save
as there may be an exception of issues presenting claims of
constitutional right, a matter which need not be considered
or decided now.228
This passing comment is arguably dicta. But the unresolved suggestion is puzzling. At the very least, it suggests that constitutional challenges to agency action are fundamentally different
from other challenges because they implicate constitutional
rights and, therefore, require some greater evidentiary leeway
than a strict application of the record rule.
In Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Borough of Ben Avon,229 a 1920 case
involving a due process challenge to allegedly confiscatory agency
action, the Court insisted that courts should always engage in an
“independent judgment as to both law and facts” when such claims

223

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Borough of Ben Avon, 253 U.S. 287, 290 (1920).
Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Liscio v. Campbell, 34 F.2d 646, 647
(2d Cir. 1929) (“[T]he final hearing upon the bill must in any case be limited to the proceedings before the administrator.”).
225 280 U.S. 420 (1930).
226 Id. at 431.
227 See id. at 443.
228 Id.
229 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
224
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are presented.230 It is unclear exactly what the Court meant here.
Perhaps “independent judgment” means that plaintiffs should be
allowed to freely supplement the administrative record. On the
other hand, it may simply indicate that appellate courts reviewing
lower court decisions should engage in a de novo review of the factual record submitted, giving no deference to the lower court’s interpretation of the record. After Ohio Valley Water, some lower
courts interpreted the “independent judgment” language as a directive to hear evidence outside of the record presented when a
plaintiff challenges agency action on constitutional grounds.231
Other lower courts disagreed, arguing that constitutional challenges should still be limited to the administrative record.232
In later cases, the Supreme Court applied the record rule
even in constitutional challenges to agency action, suggesting
that the approach in Ohio Valley Water and Tagg Bros. was more
the exception than the rule. For example, in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America,233 the Court considered a due process challenge to a rate scheduling order issued
by the Federal Power Commission.234 In reviewing the constitutional questions posed, the Court saw no need to go beyond the
record submitted by the Commission. As the Court explained:
Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings made and
other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of
due process have been overstepped. If the Commission’s

230

Id. at 289.
See, e.g., Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 57 F.2d 735, 739 (D.
Colo. 1932):
231

Where the attack [against an administrative order] is made upon constitutional
grounds, a court is required to exercise its independent judgment as to both law
and facts.
...
We are compelled, therefore, to hear [petitioner’s] evidence and to decide for ourselves whether the order of the Secretary deprives petitioner of its property without due process of law.
232 See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 327 (W.D.
Mo. 1935) (“If in a judicial review of an order of the Secretary his findings supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive upon the reviewing court in every case where a constitutional issue is not involved, why are they not conclusive when a constitutional issue
is involved?”).
233 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
234 See id. at 578, 581.
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order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.235
This standard, reiterated a year later in a challenge to a Federal
Communications Commission regulation,236 essentially applies
the record rule to constitutional challenges to agency action. The
Court announced that, to assess the due process issue, it would
consider only the Commission’s order in light of “the facts before
it”—what today we would call the administrative record. Thus,
the Court recognized that, even when a plaintiff raises constitutional questions, courts should generally limit their inquiry to the
record before the decisionmaker at the time they made their decision. These rulings, issued as the early versions of the APA were
being debated, no doubt would have been on the minds of the
drafters. A faithful interpretation of the APA’s procedural dimensions must hew close to them.
D. Post-APA Precedent
Supreme Court precedent on the scope of judicial review under the APA also supports a record-rule approach to constitutional challenges. Contrary to the approach of some lower courts,
the Court’s APA precedent has never suggested that the availability of extra-record evidence depends on the type of claim alone.
Rather, Overton Park states that supplementation of extra-record
evidence is solely dependent upon whether the plaintiff can make
a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”237 Thus,
while the reviewing court may be the master of law, the agency is
the master of facts. As described in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Lorion,238 “[t]he task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review to the agency decision based on the
record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”239 In other
words, the standard of review changes according to the legal
claim, but the evidentiary “focal point” is the same: “[T]he administrative record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.”240
235

Id. at 586.
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (holding that the
lower court correctly limited its inquiry “to review of the evidence before the [Federal Communications] Commission” when assessing plaintiffs’ constitutional claims).
237 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
238 470 U.S. 729 (1985).
239 Id. at 743–44 (citation omitted).
240 Camp, 411 U.S. at 142.
236
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This boundary between questions of law and questions of fact
in APA review stems from the Court’s longstanding principle of
judicial deference to agency decision-making. Executive agencies
are a separate branch of the same government. They are authorized by Congress to make decisions on highly specialized matters.
As noted in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,241 the “Court has recognized, ever since
Fletcher v. Peck,242 that judicial inquiries into . . . executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of
other branches of government.”243 Thus, the rules of judicial review must carefully avoid such substantial intrusions. The underlying assumption is that generalist judges are ill-suited to substitute their own judgment for the reasoned judgment of an agency
decisionmaker.
Furthermore, introducing extra-record evidence often requires extra-record discovery. And judge-sanctioned discovery
has the potential to amount to a particularly substantial intrusion into the workings of the Executive Branch. Burdensome discovery—such as deposing government officials, answering interrogatories, gathering documents for production lists—costs the
government time and money and has the potential to disrupt the
ongoing business of administrative governance. This is why, as
stated in Arlington Heights, “[p]lacing a decisionmaker on the
stand is [ ] usually to be avoided.”244 Thus, courts attach a “presumption of regularity” to the “actions of Government agencies,”
including the submission of an administrative record for judicial
review.245 Applying the APA record rule to constitutional challenges to agency action is in keeping with this longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence on the limits of judicial review of
agency action. Within this framework, the record rule plays an
important role in limiting judicial intrusion into agency decisionmaking, ensuring speedy resolution of plaintiffs’ legitimate
claims against agencies, and limiting frivolous fishing expeditions
that waste government funds.

241

429 U.S. 252 (1977).
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
243 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 n.18 (quotation marks omitted).
244 Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985) (“The reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo
inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an
inquiry.”).
245 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001).
242
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However, the APA does not demand complete judicial abstention. It requires reviewing courts to “set aside”246 unlawful or unconstitutional agency actions after reviewing “the whole record.”247 In other words, the APA provides a presumption of
thorough judicial review of questioned agency action. Moreover,
while the “whole record” requirement prohibits courts from probing the “mental processes of administrative decisionmakers,”248 it
also requires that courts engage in something more than a cursory review of agency action. Indeed, the Court has indicated that
the APA “imposes a general ‘procedural’ requirement of sorts by
mandating that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide
an explanation that will enable the court to evaluate the agency’s
rationale at the time of decision.”249
A robust bad faith exception to the record rule ensures that
courts can engage in a thorough review of agency action, particularly in constitutional challenges. Specifically, courts should interpret the strong showing of bad faith and improper behavior
standard broadly. The bad faith standard should encompass
Overton Park’s suggestion that a “bare record” that does “not disclose the factors that were considered” may necessitate extra-record
evidence to “determine if the [decisionmaker] acted within the
scope of his authority.”250 After all, a bare record may be a strong
indicator of bad faith. The standard should also encompass the
similar statement, in Camp, that extra-record evidence may be
necessary when there is “such failure to explain administrative
action as to frustrate effective judicial review.”251 Courts should
interpret failures to explain agency action as presumptive evidence of bad faith. When agencies fail or refuse to adequately explain their decisions, the burden should be on them to “provide an
explanation,”252 in the Court’s words, that will allow thorough judicial review.
One strong counterargument against a robust bad faith exception stems from the Supreme Court’s admonition in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council253 that courts cannot impose additional procedural
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
5 U.S.C. § 706.
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142–43.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 654.
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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requirements on agencies beyond those specified in the APA.254
Theoretically speaking, the record rule is a procedural requirement derived from the text of the APA.255 Following the reasoning
of Vermont Yankee, a court that allows plaintiffs to supplement
the record in a constitutional challenge to agency action may be
“impos[ing] . . . its own notion of which procedures are . . . most
likely to further some vague, undefined public good.”256 After all,
forcing an agency to comply with discovery requests imposes a
kind of procedural hurdle.
However, Vermont Yankee is not fatal to a robust bad faith
exception. First, the APA requires courts to “set aside agency action” that is arbitrary and capricious, “contrary to constitutional
right,” or otherwise unlawful.257 The APA would not at once require courts to set aside unlawful agency action and hamstring
them from doing just that by proscribing any supplementation of
inadequate records. Second, allowing extra-record evidence in
some constitutional challenges to agency action is far less burdensome than the additional procedures the Court was reviewing in
Vermont Yankee. There, the Court sought primarily to reiterate
the “very basic tenet of administrative law” that “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances . . .
agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.”258
Allowing courts to demand extra-record evidence in limited situations is less burdensome than the court-imposed rulemaking
procedures reviewed in Vermont Yankee, procedures that went
well beyond the APA’s default rules. Moreover, a strong showing
of bad faith may be just the “extremely compelling circumstance[ ]”259 that the Vermont Yankee Court thought would justify
courts imposing extraneous procedure. Finally, the fact that the
Court recently reaffirmed some version of the bad faith exception
suggests that the exception is consistent with Vermont Yankee.
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY CASE FOR A RECORD-RULE APPROACH
This Part explores several policy arguments in favor of a
record-rule approach. Ultimately, two important interests are at
stake in disputes over extra-record evidence on constitutional
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id. at 524.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Gavoor & Platt, supra note 18, at 19.
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549.
5 U.S.C. § 706–(2)(B).
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543–44 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 543.
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claims. First is the plaintiff’s interest in receiving adequate judicial review.260 After all, the APA instructs courts to “set aside”
agency action that infringes upon claims of constitutional right.261
Second is the administrative agency’s interest in avoiding burdensome litigation. Agencies, empowered by congressional statute and directed by the executive, are engaged in important and
specialized work, often in obscure and technical subject areas.
Courts rightfully defer to their judgment on technical issues, including the development of administrative records. Courts should
impede the independent work of agencies only when they have a
good reason to do so. The APA recognizes this, having set specific
boundaries on judicial review. Any evidentiary framework for judicial review of agency action must balance the competing interests
of private plaintiffs and of agencies themselves.
One of the central policy arguments against a non-record-rule
approach is that it may undermine the APA’s “whole record” limitation on judicial review of agency action, thereby potentially imposing significant burdens on agency policymaking. By allowing
extra-record evidence as a matter of course for all constitutional
challenges to agency action, a non-record-rule approach would
create a problematic loophole. It would give unsuccessful APA
plaintiffs a fail-safe backup plan that allows them to evade the
APA’s evidentiary limitations.262 Smart APA plaintiffs might
simply add a constitutional claim to their complaint to evade the
record rule in the first instance. On the other hand, plaintiffs who
try but fail to meet the Overton Park “substantial showing” standard could potentially amend their complaint to include a constitutional claim, thereby sidestepping Overton Park altogether.263

260 See Saul, supra note 54, at 1309 (arguing that, by urging more restrictive record
rule standards, administrative agencies have frustrated adequate judicial review of APA
claims).
261 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
262 Cf. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (“The APA’s restriction
of judicial review to the administrative record would be meaningless if any party seeking review based on statutory or constitutional deficiencies was entitled to broad-ranging
discovery.”).
263 Cf. Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass’n, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1238:

[T]o hold [that constitutional claims are not subject to the APA’s procedural provisions] would be to incentivize every unsuccessful party to agency action to allege bad faith, retaliatory animus, and constitutional violations to trade in the
APA’s restrictive procedures for the more even-handed ones of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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Thus, agencies could face more discovery requests, prolonged litigation, and higher compliance costs.264
The claim-specific approach is also unconvincing. Cases that
use this approach tend to create difficult line-drawing problems.
Some claim-specific cases attempt to distinguish between constitutional claims that challenge the substance of agency decisionmaking and those that challenge the procedures used to reach a
decision.265 Others try to distinguish between constitutional
claims that overlap with plaintiffs’ nonconstitutional claims and
those that are fundamentally different.266 As a practical evidentiary standard, both distinctions are probably unworkable. What
if the questioned procedure directly affected the substance of the
decision? How much overlap is too much for extra-record evidence? These line-drawing problems would grant the trial judge
considerable discretion. A plaintiff-friendly judge could find
unique questions raised by any constitutional challenge to agency
action, thus necessitating extra-record evidence. An agencyfriendly judge could find some overlap between every constitutional and nonconstitutional challenge. The record rule approach
no doubt also creates difficult line-drawing problems in applying
the bad faith standard. But at least it imposes a burden of production on the plaintiff to show, as an evidentiary matter, why
extra-record evidence is appropriate. The claim-specific approach,
on the other hand, involves a judge-driven analysis of legal arguments. In an area of law where confusion reigns, clarity of application is a valuable commodity.
A record-rule approach is superior for two main reasons.
First, a record-rule approach has the potential to be more predictable and consistent in application. Under this approach, the specific type of legal argument deployed would have no effect on the
record supplementation standard used by the court. While the
bad faith exception could hardly be considered well-developed,
264 This point parallels Justice Thomas’s criticism of the Court’s endorsement of pretextbased challenges to administrative agency action in Department of Commerce. He argued
that by invalidating an agency action as “pretextual,” the Court “opened a Pandora’s box.”
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Any “significant agency action is vulnerable to the kinds of allegations the Court credits
today. . . . Opponents of future executive actions can be expected to make full use of the
Court’s new approach.” Id. Likewise, the non-record-rule approach to extra-record discovery in constitutional challenges would provide a powerful tool to the political enemies of
any presidential administration to burden the executive branch with endless discovery
motions.
265 See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 166–73 and accompanying text.

1552

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

focusing all extra-record-evidence questions around this one exception would further its development as a workable standard.
Second, applying the record rule to constitutional challenges to
agency action ensures that plaintiffs cannot sidestep the APA’s
evidentiary restrictions through artful pleading. Why challenge
an agency action under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
when you can challenge the action on constitutional grounds and,
ipso facto, receive more favorable evidentiary rules? The recordrule approach thus provides clarity and symmetry in application.
The primary argument against the record-rule approach is
that it is simply too restrictive. After all, constitutional claims involve critical rights that may trump agency interests in avoiding
burdensome litigation and the general deference owed agencies
on technical judgments. The record rule, as applied to constitutional claims, may also raise separation of powers concerns. In
Crowell v. Benson,267 for example, the Court cautioned, in the context of judicial review of Article I fact-finding, that “the enforcement of constitutional rights” requires federal courts to make an
independent judgment free from significant agency interference.268 Too much deference to agencies on constitutional issues
would undermine “the essential independence of the exercise of
the judicial power of the United States.”269 To safeguard Article III power, critics may argue, courts require an independent assessment on questions of law and fact when constitutional issues
are raised.
These critiques come up short. First, many constitutional issues
can be resolved on the record as submitted. After all, the record
properly includes all materials before the agency at the time it
made its decision. If any such materials were not included, the
plaintiff can move for record completion without having to make
a strong showing of bad faith. Only in those exceptional circumstances when a constitutional issue rears its head and the record
is silent does the record supplementation question arise. When an
agency has committed a constitutional violation and the record
does not speak to the violation, extra-record evidence would likely
be warranted even under a strict reading of the bad faith exception to the record rule. Second, the record rule deals only with the
scope of evidence, not with the standard of review or the availability of review generally. Thus, while the record rule limits the
267
268
269

285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 64.
Id.
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judiciary’s ability to make a wholly independent judgment on constitutional issues, it does not deny that independent judgment altogether. For the reasons stated above, this channeling of judicial
review is appropriate given the importance of respecting agency
spheres of expertise and avoiding burdensome litigation.
A robust bad faith exception that incorporates the “bare record” and “frustration of judicial review” standards also alleviates
some of these concerns.270 In situations where an agency provides
such a hollow record that it undermines judicial review, allegations of constitutional violation might be more plausible. Consider
recent lawsuits alleging “discriminatory animus” in agency rulemaking. In Wolf, for example, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for extra-record discovery on their equal protection claim,
reasoning that, “because evidence of racial animus (if any) will
reside outside the administrative record, presumptively limiting
discovery to the record can allow the racial motivations underlying racially motivated policymaking to remain concealed.”271 However, under the record rule, a mere allegation of racial animus
should not be enough to reach extra-record evidence. To satisfy
the Overton Park bad faith standard, the administrative record
as submitted must be so inadequate as to prevent a court from
assessing the agency’s stated reasons for a decision.272 If the
agency has not provided a sufficient explanation of its decisionmaking, it is likely that questionable motivations were at play.
This kind of scenario would be the most likely trigger for extrarecord discovery on a constitutional claim. In other words, the insufficiency of the record itself may be evidence enough to allow
extra-record evidence.273
A final policy consideration stems from the recent presidential transition. As the Biden administration takes command of the
executive branch, it inherits a deeply divided political landscape.
Congress seems hopelessly ineffectual. President Biden, like his

270

See supra notes 250–53.
Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 795.
272 Department of Commerce has now become the prime example of a bad faith showing. The Court found bad faith because “the evidence tells a story that does not match the
explanation the Secretary gave for his decision.” Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575. In other
words, the record indicated that the Secretary’s explanation was pretextual. Thus, if a
plaintiff can indicate that the agency has given “contrived reasons” for their decision then
they have met the bad faith standard and may add extra-record evidence. Id. at 2576.
273 Cf. Grill, 2012 WL 174873, at *4 (“The record, as we know it, . . . does supply a
reasonable inference to support some behind-the-scenes decision making, i.e., that not all
the reasons for the decision are in the record.”).
271
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predecessors, will likely turn to the administrative state to enact
critical aspects of his policy agenda. This will, no doubt, lead to
lawsuits, with many likely including constitutional challenges. A
non-record-rule approach to discovery in these suits would frustrate the ability of the Biden administration to enact its policies.
One’s view on whether this is essentially good or bad depends, of
course, on political preference. But with divided government becoming increasingly commonplace, Republicans and Democrats
would likely agree, behind a veil of ignorance, that burdening
future administrations with discovery requests and costly litigation could present a serious threat to effective governance.
As then-Professor Elena Kagan declared two decades ago, we
live in an age of “presidential administration.” 274 Presidents
routinely “legislate” through executive branch action, enacting
controversial policy initiatives through the arcane procedures of
administrative law. I reserve judgment on whether this is essentially good or essentially bad. But the virtues of this system
should be decided on the merits, the separation of powers issues
addressed head-on. Gumming up the regulatory process through
burdensome discovery requests is the wrong way to rein in an administrative state run amok.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that constitutional challenges to
administrative agency action should generally be subject to the
procedural framework for judicial review imposed by the APA,
namely the rule against extra-record evidence. In particular, I argue for a record rule approach to the issue. Courts should limit
their review of constitutional challenges to the administrative
record submitted by the agency. Only with a “strong showing of
bad faith or improper behavior” may plaintiffs supplement this
record with extraneous evidence. However, I argue for a broad
reading of the bad faith exception to guard against the frustration
of judicial review. This approach balances the interests of agencies in avoiding burdensome discovery with the interests of plaintiffs in receiving thorough judicial resolution of their constitutional claims. If adopted, the record-rule approach would add
considerable stability to an area of administrative law where it is
badly needed.
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Kagan, supra note 1, at 2254.

